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SUFFERING THE 
MODERNIST 
LEGACY OF 
HUSSERLIAN 
PHENOMENOLOGY
James J. Hodge
Testing the Limit: Derrida, Levinas, 
Henry, and the Phenomenological 
Tradition by François-David 
Sebbah. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2012. Pp. 336. 
$90.00 cloth, $29.95 paper.
Phenomenology has received a 
curiously spotty reception in the 
wake of the influx of Continental 
philosophy in language depart-
ments in North America beginning 
in the 1960s. Of the three major 
philosophers in the phenomeno-
logical tradition, Martin Heidegger 
remains the most widely read, yet 
he is also regularly discussed as 
though somehow beyond the con-
text of phenomenology. Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s death in 1961 
deprived him of the opportunity 
to engage the emerging Anglo-
American appetite for French 
theory in person and in “the flesh.” 
More significantly, it denied him 
the chance of responding to the 
casual statements levied against 
phenomenology in the works of 
Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, 
and other stars of the ’68 genera-
tion. And although his voluminous 
and antiseptic prose has undoubt-
edly turned off many potential 
readers, Edmund Husserl’s leg-
acy has suffered from the errant 
impression that Jacques Derrida’s 
most famous works from 1967—
including Of Grammatology and 
especially Voice and Phenomenon—
constitute something of a sum-
mary rejection of Husserl’s project 
insofar as it represents the grand 
villain of the “metaphysics of pres-
ence.” Husserl’s reputation—again, 
within language departments and 
not necessarily philosophy depart-
ments—has suffered in inverse 
correlation with Derrida’s status 
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as perhaps the most influential and 
famous avatar of so-called “French 
theory.” This situation has always 
been quite unfair to Husserl and 
phenomenology more generally.
With the rise of interest in the 
body, embodiment, and affect 
in the last two decades or so, the 
situation has started to change. 
Phenomenology has begun to 
achieve more critical currency. 
Merleau-Ponty’s work has proven 
particularly important for the work 
of several influential scholars in the 
fields of film studies and new media 
studies. Beyond the work of Vivian 
Sobchack and Mark B. N. Hansen, 
however, the word phenomenology 
has largely become disconnected 
from its philosophical origins.1 Use 
of the word phenomenological as 
a synonym for embodied experi-
ence constitutes merely the most 
egregious symptom of this condi-
tion. Discussion of Husserl’s work, 
it almost goes without saying, 
remains marginal at best, and the 
very meaning of phenomenology 
remains unproductively elusive.
Although it is not aimed at cor-
recting these problems of North 
American literary and media stud-
ies, Stephen Barker’s translation 
of François-David Sebbah’s 2001 
monograph Testing the Limit offers 
a potent resource for those inter-
ested in not only phenomenology 
but in understanding its legacy 
for several important continental 
philosophers. The specific achieve-
ment of Sebbah’s text lies with his 
careful and revealing readings 
of Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel 
Levinas, Michel Henry, and Jean-
Luc Marion among a group of 
French philosophers whose con-
cern with issues of givenness, time, 
and subjectivity all ultimately 
derive from Husserl and thus 
share a certain family resemblance. 
Sebbah refers to these philosophers 
as phenomenologists, a key deci-
sion no doubt meant to provoke. 
It is no surprise to discuss Henry 
or Marion as phenomenologists, 
but eyebrows might be raised with 
respect to Derrida and Levinas. 
Even though Levinas studied with 
both Husserl and Heidegger in 
Freiburg, and Derrida spent the 
first decade of his career writing 
about Husserl, both thinkers are 
generally thought of as breaking 
with phenomenology in order to 
establish their own philosophical 
projects. Carefully avoiding the 
politics of labeling philosophers as 
phenomenologists with a capital P, 
Sebbah admirably explores their 
work as operating within the lon-
ger tradition of phenomenology 
in a refreshingly nonpartisan and 
nongenerationalist manner.
Sebbah synthesizes the work 
of these often very different phi-
losophers by devoting himself to 
specifying how each operates at 
the extreme limits of Husserlian 
phenomenology. To pursue this 
project, Sebbah explicitly suspends 
consideration of phenomenology’s 
more recent theological turn (and 
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silently suspends analysis of simi-
larly contemporary efforts to natu-
ralize phenomenology in concert 
with research in cognitive sci-
ence and neuroscience).2 At least 
in the North American context, 
the impact of this decision regis-
ters beyond the already significant 
but ultimately highly specialized 
payoff associated with the astute 
reconsideration of the rich work 
of individual philosophers. More 
broadly, Sebbah’s work produc-
tively opens up the question of the 
phenomenological tradition as part 
of a larger question of historiciz-
ing phenomenology and its heirs 
within a modernist tradition.
Phenomenology properly 
emerges with Husserl in the early 
twentieth century. As Husserl and 
many other practitioners observe, 
phenomenology is not so much a 
school of philosophy as a method 
for the investigation into phenom-
ena and their fundamentally par-
tial appearance to consciousness or, 
as Husserl puts it, perception by 
adumbration. The suspension or 
bracketing of empirical reality—
what is generally known as the 
universal epoché—constitutes the 
distinctive methodological opera-
tion of Husserlian phenomenology. 
The meaning, extent, and dubious 
success of the epoché, then, represent 
one of the most significant themes 
in the phenomenological tradition. 
Many writers might be content to 
cast judgment on Husserl’s philo-
sophical project accordingly. To his 
great credit, Sebbah reads Derrida, 
Levinas, and Henry as not break-
ing with Husserlian phenomenol-
ogy on the basis of its success or 
failure, but continually dwelling at 
the extreme limits of the phenom-
enological enterprise in the aporia 
of phenomenality and nongiven-
ness as the “very matrix of all apo-
ria” composing phenomenology as 
“less a field of problems than a field 
of aporias” that also includes time 
and subjectivity (245, 244). It is this 
shared sense of a common modus 
operandi among Derrida, Levinas, 
and Henry that inspires the richly 
suggestive title of Sebbah’s study: 
L’épreuve de la limite. Translated 
into English as Testing the Limit, 
Sebbah’s use of the term épreuve 
taps into its polyvalence as meaning 
a test, an experience, and suffering. 
Each meaning of the term suggests 
a slightly different dimension of 
Sebbah’s project. On the one hand, 
he indicates that Derrida, Levinas, 
and Henry all put the limits of phe-
nomenology to the test, so to speak. 
But further, their writings also con-
stitute a continual  working-through 
of the fundamentally irresolvable 
aporias that preoccupy phenom-
enological investigation—especially 
the aforementioned issues of given-
ness, time, and subjectivity. These 
writers experience the limit in their 
own writing and we with them. 
Finally, as Sebbah reflects, the expe-
rience of reading Derrida, Levinas, 
and Henry—as many readers may 
agree with a knowing wink—can 
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be somewhat traumatic. The fre-
quently opaque, nonlogical—
which is not to say illogical—and 
literary quality of their writings 
expresses the ordeal of testing the 
limits of phenomenology. And it is 
this observation, perhaps more than 
any other sustained analysis in the 
book, that opens up Sebbah’s proj-
ect to wider stakes.
Here it becomes helpful to 
recall Martin Jay’s astute placement 
of phenomenology in the wider 
historical field of modernism. 
Modernism, of course, is and has 
been many things, yet one particu-
larly dominant characterization of 
its spirit concerns what Jay, citing 
Renato Poggioli, calls its “mystique 
of purity.”3 Instanced by the inces-
sant theoretical and practical con-
cern of many artists and critics alike 
to determine the unique character-
istics of art forms such as paint-
ing, cinema, and literature—for 
example, Wassily Kandinsky, Hans 
Richter, and Gertrude Stein and 
Clement Greenberg, André Bazin, 
and the New Critics—this drive 
similarly informs phenomenology 
as, first and foremost, a discourse 
founded against what philosophers 
of the day termed psychologism, or 
the tendency to reduce the mind 
to the psyche in such a way that 
obscures the apodictic nature of 
logic and mathematics in a shroud 
of crude relativism. While it is 
impossible to rehearse the problem 
of psychologism here, it suffices 
to say that the Husserlian epoché 
constitutes a classically modernist 
methodological attempt to suspend 
every contaminating influence 
from the outside world that might 
obfuscate knowledge of the things 
themselves. The modernist drive 
to isolate, suspend, and purify lies 
behind both the power and the lim-
its of Husserlian phenomenology. 
And it is precisely these limits to 
which Sebbah attends both in his 
method and his critical readings. It 
is perhaps instructive to remember 
this larger context of modernism in 
reading Sebbah’s claim about his 
own methodology. He writes that 
it is not his goal to “ask questions 
of a text, but rather to think within 
a text, to take it as a medium allow-
ing for the possibility of a thought 
that no other has ever made or will 
ever make possible” (11). One finds 
here some of the core ideas of the 
modernist drive so briefly sketched 
earlier, including a certain her-
meticism poised against the pos-
sibility of mixing or comparing, as 
well as something of a background 
notion of medium specificity. No 
doubt Sebbah does not intend to 
invoke Clement Greenberg, yet 
viewed alongside modernism one 
detects the remarkable notion of 
Husserlian phenomenology as 
a philosophical medium always 
straining to stave off the influence 
of the mixed media of empirical 
reality.
Sebbah’s lucid, always probing 
analyses of his subjects likewise 
reveal further connection with 
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phenomenology’s heritage in the 
writings of mid- and late-twenty-
first-century French philosophers. 
It is difficult to miss the influence 
of modernism at certain moments, 
as when Sebbah cites Levinas’s 
idea that to listen to music is to 
resist dance (as though confront-
ing one artistic genre necessitates 
the suspension of another). At 
other moments, the generative 
confluence of phenomenology, 
modernism, and literary analysis 
reveals a deeper affinity. Sebbah’s 
analyses of Levinas and Derrida 
on literary works by Edgar Allan 
Poe and James Joyce here prove 
remarkable. As Sebbah writes, 
Levinas’s discussion of the fear of 
being interred alive in Poe’s “Cask 
of Amontillado” (1846) starkly 
illustrates the broader themes of 
alterity at the root of givenness 
and subjectivity, or the “horror of 
being” (144). This citation vividly 
aligns Levinas’s philosophical proj-
ect and an early master of modern 
American literature with Sebbah’s 
own stated methodological injunc-
tion to dwell within the medium of 
a text to its limit. Sebbah’s empha-
sis of Derrida’s reading of the cir-
culation of breath in Ulysses (1922) 
similarly aligns modernist litera-
ture with the investigation of core 
problems of subjectivity. More 
broadly, the payoff, for Sebbah, 
of reading Derrida as a phenom-
enologist lies at least in part with 
the way such a view reorients our 
understanding of deconstruction as 
expressing both “the impossibility 
of the phenomenological reduction 
and the impossibility of not desir-
ing the reduction” (56). The wider 
payoff may be to historicize decon-
struction in terms of the longer 
phenomenological and modernist 
inheritance of its singular prefer-
ence for articulating the aporias of 
language—that is, of the very limits 
of language.
Sebbah’s affinity for the aporias 
of thought finally, and produc-
tively, ends on the issue of rhythm. 
Dwelling with the medium of phe-
nomenological thought provides its 
own ongoing reward, rhetorically 
invoked with the frequent men-
tions of mise en abyme and the 
flicker of givenness and nongiven-
ness. “Rhythm,” Sebbah writes, 
“ceaselessly awakens phenomenal-
ity” (200). Such rhythm can be scru-
tinized only within the limits of 
phenomenological investigation. If 
phenomenology constitutes a kind 
of modernist formalism, then it is 
also of an unusually restless variety 
that resists schematic thinking—
indeed, that resists ending, solid-
ity, or firm labels for concepts that 
will always require testing and 
retesting. And, as Sebbah’s insight-
ful book demonstrates, perhaps the 
only way to gain insight into such 
a restless  rhythm is to partici pate 
within it oneself, to join one’s thought 
to an ongoing test of a method 
that seeks to block everything out 
but the thing itself. Some have 
scoffed at the supposedly  idealist 
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fruitlessness of such an endeavor, 
but, as Sebbah’s book attests, so 
much can be gained by exploring 
its limits, as well as the modernist 
drive that informs its practice.
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